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The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(EUKOR) is the most ambitious FTA 
negotiated by the European Union. It 
is clear that the EU has negotiated an 
agreement with emphasis on getting 
new market access rather than exposing 
domestic industries to greater competi-
tion. The EU receives market access in 
almost all its key sectors, including ag-
riculture, automotives, pharmaceuticals, 
electronics and services. Non-Tariff Bar-
riers (NTBs) in Korea will be cut in sec-
tors where the EU has export interests. 
Yet there is a fear that the deal may 
be rejected by the European Parliament, 
primarily because of EUKOR’s effect on 
the automotive sector. But the notion of 
a Korean car invasion is a myth. Critics 
have grossly misrepresented the agree-
ment and its results. Firstly, Korean auto-
mobile manufacturers only have a small 
share (12 percent) of imported cars to 
the EU. Korean cars compete principally 
in one segment of the market – small 
cars – and compete to a large extent 
with other foreign producers. All the oth-
er segments of the auto market are large-
ly unaffected by Korean competition. 
Secondly, export of heavy goods 
(cars) concentrated to a small number 
of firms (Hyundai and Kia) will to a large 
extent be substituted by foreign direct in-
vestment. This is already a pattern in the 
sales of Korean car brands on the EU 
market. Concentrated to two brands, it 
has proven much more efficient for Ko-
rean automotive firms to locate produc-
tion in Europe rather than to export from 
Korea to Europe at high transport costs. 
If anything, the trade deal with Korea 
is likely to have a positive effect on the 
scale of Korean auto FDI in Europe. 
Thirdly, European auto exports to Ko-
rea stand to benefit as Korea not only 
eliminates its tariffs on vehicles (also at 
a faster pace than Europe eliminates its 
equivalent tariffs), but also reduces its 
NTBs significantly. A study suggests an 
increase of over 400 percent – albeit 
from very low levels. 
Finally, the biggest myth is the notion 
that saying no to the agreement is a cost-
free option. A rejection of the agreement 
would undermine Europe’s credibility in 
trade talks, and is not likely to make Ko-
rea more amenable to re-write the agree-
ment in Europe’s favour. 
 
SUMMARY
Four years after the launch of Global Europe – the 
European Union’s trade strategy from 2006 – policy-
makers are now confronted with the first negotiated 
agreement with one of the rising economic powers 
in the Far East. The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(hereafter EUKOR) is the first of Europe’s “new” Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs). Traditionally a sceptic of 
bilateral, or preferential, trade agreements unless they 
were part of a broader political strategy (like a step-
ping-stone to full accession to the European Union), 
the EU in 2006 ventured in to a strategy which had 
FTAs front and centre.  
It is well known to trade economists and practitioners 
that preferential trade agreements are far from ideal. 
Principally, they are based on discrimination against 
third countries. Practically, they are often difficult and 
cumbersome to negotiate, and are seldom of great val-
ue to global firms who cannot adjust sales or sourcing 
strategies after a bilateral agreement. Economically, 
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the benefits are typically not substantial when there are 
only two parties involved in a trade agreement, and the 
inherent discrimination provokes (sometimes profound) 
trade diversion.1
Despite such concerns, it is easy to understand Europe’s 
desire to negotiate new FTAs with other countries. Firstly, 
the impetus for global trade liberalisation – in the context 
of negotiations in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) – 
had slowed down remarkably in the middle of the nough-
ties. The Doha Round had already had serial collapses and 
the prospect for improvements was bleak. It does not look 
better today. Regardless of the fate of the Doha Round, it 
is reasonable to think it will be long before the full set of 
WTO members in a post-Doha world can coalesce around 
an all-encompassing trade agreement which substantially 
liberalises trade. A diligent actor, then, will not pause its 
trade strategy till that moment arises, if it ever will. It 
seeks, and rightly so, other means to achieve trade liber-
alisation that brings economic benefits.
Secondly, there are trade barriers that are very unlikely 
to be liberalised multilaterally, even under the assump-
tion that the Doha Round will resurrect and the WTO 
will regain its centrality in global trade policy. Non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) – which are far bigger than tariffs and 
increasing– are one of those barriers, but they are not 
alone. Rightly pursued, bilateral trade negotiations can 
reduce NTBs – often in a non-discriminatory fashion, 
bringing the benefits to a larger set of countries. 
Thirdly, many emerging markets still have significant 
trade barriers and in some markets these are prohibitive 
and severely restrict the ability of European firms to in-
crease sales or investment to them. In emerging markets 
whose economic size is already substantial, it is impera-
tive that improvements of market access move faster than 
the speed of multilateral trade liberalisation. South Ko-
rea ticks all of these boxes and should be a candidate for 
a trade agreement with the EU. The United States also 
thought of Korea in similar terms and negotiated an FTA 
with Korea a few years ago.2  Yet the EUKOR agreement 
has run into opposition – mainly from small but vocal sec-
tor interests. One member state vetoed the agreement, 
and the start date of the agreement had to be postponed 
to get its support. As it was proved possible to open up 
the agreement again – even if only on the issue of starting 
date – there are again mounting fears that the process in 
the European Parliament will be difficult and that new 
political demands will have to be taken on board to get 
the acceptance of the Parliament.
Yet, the opposition to EUKOR is surprising – even to 
chastened political cynics. One could have seen a mate-
rial rationale for opposing the agreement if it had been 
ventured by free-trade ideologues with deep affinity to 
multilateralism, or simply sceptical of its liberalising 
coverage. Such criticism is partially warranted. The EU-
KOR is a good distance away from free-trade purism. Its 
structure and motivation is closer to “soft mercantilism” 
than free trade. It is clear that the EU has negotiated an 
agreement with emphasis on getting new market access 
rather than exposing domestic industries to greater com-
petition – with smaller than potential dynamic gains from 
the agreement as a consequence. There are critics arguing 
that the EU has not negotiated as much new market ac-
cess as it should have. It is correct that the deal does not 
come close to reducing or eliminating as much barriers 
as would have been ideal. Perhaps it is also correct to say 
that the EU could have done a better job bending up Ko-
rea’s market. But that is an unknown – even an unknown 
unknown. What we know, however, is that EUKOR goes 
much farther in reducing barriers to trade than most oth-
er FTAs on record. This, however, is not the immediate 
concern of the free-trade purist. It is rather that EUKOR 
does not provoke as much import competition as would 
have been possible.
The surprising part is that most critics of EUKOR are 
offspring of the same trade ideology and profess mercan-
tilism, soft or hard, as the guiding principle for trade ne-
gotiations. By that standard, the EU has negotiated a good 
deal. The mercantilists overall got what they desire. Yet it 
is they who want to throw the deal in the dustbin. 
Their opposition to EUKOR is, however, largely based 
on a number of myths. Premier among them is the no-
tion that EUKOR will deal a hard blow to the European 
automotive industry, threatening substantial volumes of 
production and jobs. At a time when the European auto-
motive industry is already battling with collapsing sales, 
and many firms have survived only through government 
support, it is alleged that EUKOR will have a menacing 
effect, far greater than it would have had in normal times. 
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Also, it is assumed that saying no to the agreement will 
have no political implications: The cost for the EU of say-
ing no, and what is really at stake, is largely missing from 
the debate.
The purpose of this paper is to dispel myths about EU-
KOR. Other scholars have given full presentations of the 
agreement and estimated the gains and losses from it.3 
These need not to be rehearsed in this paper. The paper 
rather looks at the agreement in the broader perspective 
of EU trade strategy – without too much jargon or the 
usual sales pitches for the agreement – and addresses in 
greater detail the effects of the agreement on certain sec-
tors, the automotive sector in particular. It aims at giving 
a dispassionate account of what is likely, and what is not 
likely, to be the consequence of EUKOR.
THE EUKOR TRADE-OFF: THE LOGIC OF BIG 
NUMBER VERSUS LIBERALISATION
EUKOR is the first “next generation” FTA that addresses 
trade concerns beyond tariffs. Chief among these con-
cerns are non-tariff barriers (NTBs); they are significant 
barriers to trade both in Korea and the EU. In fact, NTBs 
have been estimated to have the same protection level as 
a tariff at 76 percent in Korea and 46 percent in the EU4. 
Meanwhile, the average tariff is “only” 12.2 percent in 
Korea and 5.6 percent in the EU5. Tariff reductions are 
very much “an orange almost squeezed dry” as (the then 
Trade Commissioner) Catherine Ashton put it.6 Thanks 
to various rounds of multilateral negotiations and other 
forms of liberalisation, tariffs have progressively been 
reduced to now represent only a small portion of total 
trade protection. In the EUKOR, the EU has taken full 
advantage of its relative size to receive better market ac-
cess for its exports, most notably services, food and ag-
ricultural products. It will also benefit from levelling the 
playing field for its car industry which has experienced 
difficulties in gaining access to the market in Korea. For 
instance, it appears that Italy has not been able to export a 
single car to Korea in the last five years7. The NTB provi-
sions in EUKOR, focusing on automobiles, electronics, 
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, clearly reflect 
the export interest of the EU. They will seriously shrink 
NTBs in Korea, especially in the electronics and automo-
tive sectors, and – to a lesser (but still significant) extent 
– in pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. The main 
approach of the EU has been to oblige Korea to comply 
with international standards, with which the EU regula-
tions already comply. 
EUKOR is fairly modest in the use of exemptions for 
politically sensitive goods. The EU has largely chosen to 
make transition arrangements for sectors in which Ko-
rean firms have already invested in factories and jobs in-
side the EU, notably automotives and electronics. Tariff 
elimination in these sectors will be phased in over 3-5 
years. Meanwhile, Korea’s political sensitivities and ex-
ceptions are focused on limited agricultural products 
(such as milk, bovine meat and tobacco) and enjoy transi-
tion arrangements between 5-15 years, while rice – the 
culturally important crop for Korea – and its derivative 
products are exempted.
While the benefits of EUKOR could have significant 
sectoral effects, it is unlikely that they would amount 
to measurable effects on employment or welfare.8 One 
needs to bear in mind that the EU is a market eighteen 
times larger than Korea – which is partly the reason why 
the EU chose to commence the negotiations with Ko-
rea in the first place. Korea is an advanced middle-sized 
economy with which the EU could strike an ambitious 
FTA. Korea’s relatively high trade barriers could be trans-
lated into real trade gains for Europe, while Korea’s size 
of economy made it unlikely that concessions to Korea 
would require considerable political change in Europe. 
Hence, the EU could offer improved access to its big mar-
ket through tariff reductions and demand much deeper 
liberalisation in Korea in return.
WEIGHTING THE BENEFITS OF EUKOR
Various studies have already analysed the economic 
implications of the agreement. They are based on solid 
economic modelling, but one should nevertheless be cau-
tious about the use and interpretation of any results from 
them. No quantitative method is better than the assump-
tions and approximations going into the model – and at 
the end of the day, assumptions, even informed ones, are 
only assumptions. Yet the studies show plausible estimates 
on the costs and benefits, and they all arrive at results in 
the same vicinity. Briefly put, EUKOR will give good pro-
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duction and welfare effects for Korea, but negligible ef-
fects for the EU. While an increase of 1-2 percent in GDP 
is expected for Korea,9 no study shows effects higher than 
a 0.08 percent GDP increase for the EU, which is equiva-
lent to less than 7 euro per person per year. Hence, the 
agreement does not carry any significant social impact; 
the increase in employment is insignificant.
The small economic value of a trade agreement is largely 
due to two factors. Firstly, all trade agreements create 
winners and losers, and the political motivation is often 
aimed at minimising the number of losers. This may sound 
politically commendable. But it is not a strategy that will 
produce economic gains. For the dynamic benefits of a 
trade agreement to be significant, they need to provoke 
behavioural change. If an agreement has little or no effect 
on production or productivity, the dynamic gains from 
trade are small. 
This is how the mercantilist logic bites itself in the tail. By 
maximising own exports and trade balance, and minimis-
ing displacement through import competition, consum-
ers and producers are denied the possibility of choosing 
better and more efficient goods and services abroad, 
making the EU less productive in turn. Consequently, 
an FTA without losers at home means no advantages and 
efficiencies have been imported. Arguably, the EU could 
have used this FTA to further open its market to greater 
competition. But even under such conditions, it is dif-
ficult to see how the economic gains from EUKOR could 
have been profoundly greater for the EU. This leads us to 
the second explanation. 
Secondly, the sheer difference in size between the EU and 
Korea makes it unlikely that any negotiation outcome 
would have significant impact on either productivity or 
employment rates in the EU. The potential increase in 
sales and import competition is simply not big enough to 
provoke significant economic gains. This is the problem 
with many FTAs: a big economy will not find many can-
didates with whom a bilateral trade agreement will make 
significant economic difference. A worthwhile strat-
egy, however, could be to focus on certain sectors and 
use negotiations as a crowbar for reducing entrenched 
protection – perhaps also to set precedents for future 
agreements. This is also what Europe has done: it has con-
centrated on selected sectors with entrenched support 
and set a bar for future FTA negotiations in Asia that can-
not easily be lowered.
Europe stands to benefit the most in the services sector. 
According to the CEPII/ATLASS study, the agreement 
is expected to produce an additional bilateral trade sur-
plus in services worth €3 billion, on top of the €6 billion 
the EU already enjoys. Another sector in which Europe is 
expected to gain substantially is in animal and food prod-
ucts, particularly in meat and dairy products. Contrary to 
other industries, the agricultural sector is greatly affected 
by tariff removal. The EU is expected to improve its bi-
lateral trade balance in agriculture and food products by 
€5 billion as exports will increase by €8-10 billion. This is 
an important political bargaining chip in future reform of 
agricultural subsidies in the EU. 
Furthermore, the EU will improve its bilateral trade bal-
ance with Korea in chemicals by €3.6-5.1 billion, thanks 
to the protocol on NTBs. In machinery and electronics, 
which accounts for one-third of total EU exports to Ko-
rea, studies suggest a substantial growth in exports. Bi-
lateral export growth may amount to 65% and 84% in 
electronics and machinery respectively. Korea is highly 
competitive in these sectors but the over-specialisation 
leads to inter-dependence; the industry in both countries 
relies on unique and highly value-added components 
from the other country, with little head-to-head com-
petition between them. It will bring about employment 
creation in a sector that accounts for 4.3% of total EU 
employment.
To conclude, the effect on bilateral trade balance ranges 
from €6 billion (Francois, 2007) to €10-18 billion (CE-
PII/ATLASS, 2010) to the EU’s advantage. The vast dif-
ference between these two studies depends on the fact 
that only the latest study from CEPII has taken NTBs in 
the automotive sector into account. This topic will be 
discussed further below, but it is evident that EUKOR 
clearly caters to the demands of export interests.
Finally, both Korea and the EU have responded to the 
concerns of vocal constituencies that oppose free trade 
and imports. The EU has chosen to include extensive spe-
cial provisions for its automobile sector with transition 
periods, dispute-settlement proceedings and safeguards. 
It has also catered to the lobbying of France’s audiovisual 
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sector and excluded it from the service schedules. Korea 
has been given time to prepare a transition for the agri-
cultural sector, which will also give Korea time to wait for 
the upcoming CAP reform in the EU.
In conclusion, the EU has obtained most of what it want-
ed –at least when it comes to moving the trade balance in 
its favour.
AUTOMOBILES – DISPELLING MYTHS
No other issue in EUKOR is as controversial as its ef-
fect on the automotive sector. The Commission has been 
under great pressure to make amendments to the draft. 
To a certain extent, the sensitivity around the issue is un-
derstandable. The timing could be better. The agreement 
was negotiated while the EU car industry went through a 
restructuring of historic proportions. The implications of 
the financial crisis for the car industry are felt worldwide, 
and it is by no means a problem isolated to the developed 
world. For instance, China has dealt with huge manufac-
turing overcapacities in the auto sector. Finalised auto-
mobiles are the single most important export product for 
South Korea – of its 3.5 million cars produced per year, 
approximately 2.5 million (73%) are exported.10 Cars 
and electronics are the two pillars of the Korean export 
sector and have for decades enjoyed protection and subsi-
dies at home. Exposing them to global competition is part 
of the Korean rationale to conclude an FTA with the EU.
But the European auto crisis was not caused by increased 
imports, let alone imports from Korea. The structural 
crisis in Europe was brought on by an inherent gap be-
tween consumers and manufacturers – a gap between 
market demand that shrank faster than manufacturers 
could adjust their production capacities. It is absurd to 
attribute this to Korean imports that are a very small fea-
ture of the EU market. Moreover, European consumers 
have changed their preferences towards smaller and dif-
ferent kinds of cars than those produced in Europe. In-
flexibilities caused the crisis, not trade. In fact, when EU 
manufacturers could not find a market for their cars at 
home, trade helped them tap into other markets, where 
their motor vehicles were still in demand.
History has proven time and again that favouring domestic 
producers to foreign ones will only help to make the cause 
of the problems and inefficiencies permanent. It insulates 
manufacturers from economic realities, and more impor-
tantly, from their customers and what they want. It dis-
courages innovation and adaptation of modern production 
methods – in short, it makes the sector less competitive. 
For a sector which is dependent on exports, attempts to 
protect domestic markets are fatal. All auto manufactur-
ers, including European ones, depend on economies of 
scale in both selling and producing cars – it is a volume-
driven business. While we have established the economic 
case for addressing Korean market and investment protec-
tionism, it is equally indisputable that favouring domestic 
production for imports will not help to save the industry 
but only secure Europe’s early exit from it.
In hindsight, it is not surprising that automotives have be-
come the focus of the political debate around the FTA. 
This sector has for a long time punched above its weight. 
It employs around 2.29 million people and accounts for 
3.5 percent of the GDP,11 but the political weight that the 
issue carries is much more than possible jobs or number 
of sold cars annually that is claimed to be at stake. The 
debate may not be about cars or even trade, but coming 
to terms with a Europe that cannot take perpetual growth 
and increasing exports for granted. 
THE VALUE OF MARKET ACCESS IN KOREA
To assess the gains and opportunities of the agreement 
for the auto industry, it is important to understand the 
current trade barriers in Korea. So far, only one study has 
aimed to quantify the entire extent and level of protection 
(including NTBs) that European exporters face in Korea. 
The study was conducted by CEPII on the request of the 
European Commission after the agreement was negoti-
ated. Hence, it is based on actual negotiation outcome12. 
Understandably, the results have been subject to debate 
as it concludes that the EU will have its largest export 
gain in cars and trucks, totalling €8 billion – which im-
plies an increase in bilateral exports to Korea of more 
than 400 percent. A report for the European Parliament 
has been cautious of the results, given the methodology 
of the study.13 The European Automobile Manufacturers’ 
Association, ACEA has gone as far as calling it “a typing 
error” by the European Commission.
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Notwithstanding potential problems of the result, the 
study helps to provide an idea of what kinds of forces 
come into play once one of the two most overprotected 
economies in the developed world (second only to Ja-
pan) opens its borders. Current market share of imported 
cars in Korea stands at 6 percent, which is only second to 
Japan, where the share of imported cars is just above 3 
percent. The case for improved market access for Euro-
pean cars is clear, and the effects from scaling back NTBs 
exceed the effect of tariff eliminations. While the Korean 
tariffs amount to 8 percent, the NTBs are estimated to be 
around 90 percent.14 
Judging by number of imports, the extent of burden-
some regulations in Korea appears almost prohibitive. 
The severity of NTBs prompts two questions. Firstly, has 
the offensive interests, i.e. exporters concerns, been ad-
equately addressed in EUKOR in order to unleash the 
export potential? Secondly, could an effective dismantling 
of Korean NTBs lead to such increase in EU exports as 
suggested - and can the Korean market realistically ac-
commodate such growth?
The answer to the first question seems to be affirmative. 
As the box below shows, the NTB reforms negotiated by 
the EU are significant and comprise most of the NTBs 
that the EU car industry has reported to be seriously pre-
venting market access. 
The second question is, more precisely, whether the FTA, 
providing an effect equivalent to such discount, could ac-
tually lead to the rise in EU exports up to five times to-
day’s levels? It goes without saying that such effects are 
rare. But they are neither impossible nor unprecedented. 
In fact, the predicted growth is in line with the histori-
cal development of EU exports to Korea in the past ten 
years, which multiplied by more than 13 times while the 
domestic growth rate over the period was approximately 
29 percent (Table 1) – in fact, a growth rate of 32 percent 
would be sufficient to reach the stipulated growth of 400 
percent during the five year transition period while the 
actual growth has actually been even higher in the past ten 
years. EU exporters effectively outgrew Korean domestic 
producers, thanks to changing attitudes and regulatory 
reforms that are minor compared to the package of re-
forms that the FTA will introduce.
BOX 1: THE NEGOTIATION OUTCOME OF THE FTA
•	 Regulatory convergence approach based on 
UNECE standards
•	 Positive list of products that will be recognised as 
complying with importing party’s regulations on 
entry into force. 
•	 EU list: 74 items or rules
•	 Korean list 51 items or rules; OBF and Emissions 
for Gasoline engines: transitional quota system until 
2013
•	 Certain positively listed regulations shall be harmo-
nised with UNECE within 5 years, i.e. 1 EU regula-
tion and 29 Korean regulations
•	 Revisions of list of products every 3 years
•	 Ban on introducing new regulations that diverge 
from UNECE, unless proven that they do not fulfil 
safety concerns
•	 MFN treatment on internal taxes and emission 
regulations
•	 Products with new features shall be allowed unless 
demonstrated that it creates risks for health, safety, 
environment; obligatory notification if product taken 
out of the market
•	 Establishment of a working group on motor vehicles 
and parts
•	 Chapter Fourteen (FTA dispute settlement system) 
applies, accelerated procedure]
TABLE 1: KOREAN AUTOMOBILE MARKET
Year
Growth Rate of Imported 
Cars Share
Growth Rate of  
Domestic Market
2000 61.54% 16.13%
2001 71.43% 0.71%
2002 80.56% 15.03%
2003 46.92% -18.23%
2004 38.74% -14.36%
2005 23.40% 6.48%
2006 26.91% 2.42%
2007 23.61% 5.42%
2008 17.74% -2.79%
2009 -18.21% 22.52%
Source: KAMA; KAIDA.
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The Korea Automobile Importers & Distributors Associa-
tion (KAIDA) reports that out of Korea’s total imports of 
cars, the share of mid-sized cars is increasing. Ten years 
ago, imports were dominated by cars with an engine dis-
placement size of 3000-4000cc (42%; graph 3). By 2009, 
a change of pattern is evident; the share of large cars de-
clines in favour of small cars with engine size below 3000 
cc (from 18.4% to 24.5%). The structure of imports 
suggests that imports are becoming more balanced for 
foreign exporters and that low-medium size producers 
are likely to grab the major share of the market growth. 
An analysis of EU comparative advantages demonstrates 
that besides from large-sized cars, the manufacturers of 
mid-sized cars in the EU also enjoy higher competitive-
ness (table 2). In a cross-country comparison with Japan 
and China, it becomes evident that the EU has positive 
comparative advantage (measured as revealed compara-
tive advantage) in the exact same sub-sectors, which sug-
gests that this is not a market exception in Korea but a 
common aspect of EU exports – cars made in the EU are 
outselling all other imports and currently, every second 
imported car in Korea is today manufactured in the EU 
(see graph 3a), and the lead is even more noticeable for 
diesel cars (graph 3b).
GRAPH 1: KOREAN CAR IMPORTS, BREAKDOWN BY ENGINE 
DISPLACEMENT (2000/2009)
TABLE 2: REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE ANALYSIS 
OF EU-KOREA
Code Category RCA
87032
FUEL Other vehicles, with spark-ignition 
internal combustion reciprocating piston 
engine:
1.037
870321 Of a cylinder capacity not exceeding 1,000 cc 0.017
870322 Of a cylinder capacity exceeding 1,000 cc but not exceeding 1,500 cc 0.013
870323 Of a cylinder capacity exceeding 1,500 cc but not exceeding 3,000 cc 1.211
870324 Of a cylinder capacity exceeding 3,000 cc 1.924
Source: COMTRADE, own calculations.
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GRAPH 2A: AUTO IMPORTS BY KOREA, COUNTRY 
BREAKDOWN, US 1000
GRAPH 2B: DIESEL AUTOS IMPORTS OF KOREA.
The historic development of EU exports to Korea, and 
its comparative advantages, shows that EU manufactur-
ers have the pre-requisites to expand their exports. But 
could the Korean market accommodate that growth? The 
suggested growth of 400 percent is equivalent to a to-
tal market share in Korea of 16-17 percent for European 
manufacturers. This is a reasonable level for an open mar-
ket, especially given that it starts from a very low level.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that suggests a break in 
the trend on the demand side. Korea is a highly developed 
economy with a GDP per capita that is expected to 
exceed the EU27 average by 2012.15 However, Korea has 
some features that are still similar to emerging markets, 
and one example is the remarkably low car density. With 
254 cars per 1000 inhabitants, Korea is still far behind 
Japan or the EU and it puts the country closer to mar-
kets like Russia and Brazil (graph 4) – emerging markets 
where the prospects for exporters are high for European 
car producers.16
Graph	  2a:	  Auto	  Imports	  by	  Korea,	  Country	  Breakdown,	  US	  1000
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1995 86243.608 10028.66 160007.54
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1998 6011.051 2136.221 7136.504
1999 14526.627 4304.4 52683.117
2000 28590.636 11932.807 102006.25
2001 31105.588 43026.403 161822.66
2002 64011.794 112959.16 403450.44
2003 65206.35 126911.61 548737.02
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GRAPH 3: CAR DENSITY IN THE WORLD (PER 1000 
INHABITANTS), 2008
Source: ACEA, Eurostat: Global Insight.
There are other factors that come into play, such as ex-
change rate instability of the Korean Won that could have 
strong detrimental effect on imports, even potentially 
wipe out the effects of the FTA. Consumers in Korea have 
also shown tendencies to be import averse, although the 
increase of auto imports from the EU show preferences 
are rapidly changing. However, these systemic errors have 
been constantly present throughout the past decade of 
growth, and EU export to Korea has multiplied despite 
them. 
It is clear that the gains of the FTA cannot be reaped in the 
first year after ratification due to transitional provisions 
in the agreement. The distribution and services network 
that are needed to meet such increase in demand will also 
be established gradually over several years. However, it 
should be clear that the FTA will, at least, support recent 
growth of exports. If the effect is not bigger than that, it 
still represents a significantly bigger increase in exports 
than professed by EU sectoral interests.
A final complication with recorded trade should be ob-
served. European manufacturers might wish to serve in-
creasing Korean demand by production in Korea rather 
than elsewhere. Such a scenario is not unlikely given that 
market proximity is an important factor in automotives 
and as it would further increase the profit margins of EU 
exporters. So far only one manufacturer in the EU, name-
ly Renault, has chosen that strategy in Korea (as well by 
acquiring the ailing motor division of Samsung). But this 
coin has two sides: Korean manufacturers are increasingly 
investing in production facilities inside the EU to serve 
the EU market.
Yet substitution of trade by FDI is less likely to be wide-
spread amongst EU exporters as European industrial 
relations are vastly different than in the auto industry 
elsewhere. Many of the European auto manufacturers are 
subject to strong political pressure, partly expended by 
government subsidies or past political favours. For these 
firms, a move of production to Korea would be politi-
cally costly. Also, a certain production volume is required 
to initialise production elsewhere. While Korean sales in 
the EU are largely concentrated to one company group 
(Hyundai-Kia), the increase of EU volumes in Korea will 
be divided over several competing European company 
groups, where each one of them may not reach sufficient 
volumes. This makes it more likely that the EU will con-
tinue its export or possibly initiate joint ventures with 
Korean manufacturers. Korean manufacturer, however, 
are more likely to locate production for the EU market 
in Europe. 
IS EUROPEAN AUTO MANUFACTURING UNDER 
THREAT?
But what about EU imports of Korean automotives, 
which is the more controversial element in the current 
debate in Europe. In the wake of consolidation and re-
structuring of the European car market, EU imports have 
contracted significantly. According to ACEA, the sales of 
Graph	  3:	  Car	  Density	  in	  the	  World	  (cars	  per	  1000	  inhabitants),	  2008
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Graph	  5:	  Passanger	  Cars	  in	  2009,	  Origin	  of	  EU	  Imports	  (in	  value)
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passenger cars have decreased 13% in 2009 compared to 
2007.17 The change in consumer preferences is apparent. 
The smallest category of cars (with engines of less than 
1000 cc) has grown by 19% against the general trend of 
decline.18 This change is most likely not merely a result 
of financial turbulence but more likely a long-term trend 
– which is encouraging to Korean exporters, who are high-
ly competitive in that segment. The entire trade surplus of 
Korea to EU can be found in this category (graph 5).
Source: COMTRADE
Yet Korean car manufacturers are still lagging behind 
in terms of EU market penetration when compared to 
Japan or NAFTA. According to ACEA (graph 6), Korea 
currently holds 12% of the market calculated in import 
value, which is far less than Japan (36%), US and NAFTA 
(20%) and even Turkey (14%).19 
Source: ACEA
Graph	  4:	  Trade	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It is evident that imports were more affected by the crisis 
than cars made in the EU. Imports have decreased by ap-
proximately 40 percent since 2007 (graph 7a) although 
the EU demand only contracted by 9-10 percent. The 
decline of total imports from Korean manufacturers is 
even more palpable as it fell by over 50 percent (graph 
7b), while imports of light cars have also contracted ap-
proximately to the same extent as European demand 
since 2007. So even if the Korean exports doubled fol-
lowing the FTA as some have suggested, it would barely 
regain the market share, and still be far behind the import 
volumes from Japan.
The rapid substitution for EU-made cars has three pos-
sible explanations. Firstly, one cannot exclude the pos-
sibility that consumers buy local during a time of eco-
nomic hardship. Secondly, the worst performing segment 
in terms of sales has been the lower-medium segment, 
which is also a main target group for Japanese and Ko-
rean manufacturers. Korean exports are in fact not very 
Graph	  6a:	  Imports	  on	  European	  Auto	  Market,	  Quantity
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Graph	  6b:	  Korean	  imports	  on	  European	  Auto	  Market,	  Quantity
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well diversified and focus mostly on the small car segment 
below 1500cc (66% of all car imports), and about half 
of the imports come from diesel cars.  Also, the produc-
tion structure in Korea is less flexible and traditionally 
less able to adapt to new products, leading to production 
structures focused on longer production runs and fewer 
product varieties.20
Thirdly, and importantly, the Korean direct investments 
in the EU have ramped up significantly. New produc-
tion plants have recently been established where Korean 
manufacturers have developed at least nine new models 
to meet the demand of cheap middle segment and reliable 
cars. There are two major production plants; one located 
in the Czech Republic, owned by Hyundai with an esti-
mated value of €1.45 billion, and one owned by KIA, just 
across the border in Slovakia, of similar magnitude. These 
facilities are not only final assembly factories; they cover 
the entire supply chain. For example, some 75% of parts 
used to produce KIA Ceed are expected to come from 
local suppliers and this share is about to rise to 90%. The 
production capacities of these plants are at 300,000 units 
each, with 3,500 directly employed and another 1,000 
employed indirectly. Kia also established a design centre 
in Germany, together with after-sales operations, a tech-
nical service facility and a pan-European IT hub. It is evi-
dent that foreign investments in the auto industry aim at 
establishing an integrated and comprehensive production 
base in each region.
Therefore, falling imports do not necessarily mean that 
foreign-owned enterprises are being squeezed out. This 
is supported by the statistics of newly registered automo-
tives, which shows that the Korean brands have not lost 
sales and market shares to the same extent as their imports 
have fallen: the production has simply moved to the EU. 
Given the low-end market focus, especially in a time of 
falling margins, it is clear that service cost, delivery time, 
tariffs and transport costs would motivate such invest-
ments. Investment in the EU is most likely not driven by 
the import tariff but market proximity. Any investment is 
likely to have taken account of the likelihood of EUKOR. 
The EU has also relatively modest NTBs, estimated to be 
less than the effect arising from tariffs of 10 percent. This 
is largely unaffected by the FTA for Korean exporters, as 
the deal is about bringing Korea to EU standards.
The competitiveness of European car production, or rath-
er its location and market proximity, is therefore telling, 
especially in a scenario with a weaker Euro. The sugges-
tion by some that factories would be closed once EUKOR 
has been concluded does not make commercial sense, es-
pecially as Korean corporations have just recently made 
these investments. No one could realistically hold that Ko-
rean auto manufacturers have the financial ability to make 
such capital expenditure just to write them off. 
It seems likely that enhanced bilateral trade liberalisa-
tion will lead to two different outcomes in Korea and the 
EU respectively due to market concentration, product 
dispersal and difference in preferences. It is more likely 
that increased competition imposed on European auto 
manufacturers will come from another car made in Eu-
rope by European workers with largely European compo-
nents and subcontractors – though it may carry a Korean 
brand name. Moreover, even if EUKOR is ratified, the 
safeguards would create enough political uncertainty for 
imports from Korea to motivate continued production in 
the EU.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE COST OF SAYING NO
Members of the European Parliament will soon be con-
fronted with the choice of ratifying or rejecting EUKOR. 
The European Parliament will find itself in a new position. 
The Lisbon Treaty grants it new constitutional power in 
EU trade policy, and EUKOR is the first trade agreement 
under the new treaty on which the European Parliament 
will have to give its final view. It has been argued by some 
that EUKOR might be held hostage to a Parliament that 
wishes the flex its new muscles, particularly to EU mem-
ber states and the European Commission. This may or may 
not be true. At the end of the day, it is substance and the 
consequences in the real world that matters. Even if EU-
KOR is rejected by the Parliament for procedural reasons, 
such as tilting the institutional balance in the way the EU 
negotiates its trade agreements, the effects of a rejection 
will be felt in the substance.  
This paper has aimed at weighing the case for or against 
EUKOR in a dispassionate manner. Two myths have been 
at the centre of the paper. The first myth is that the EU 
came off badly from the EUKOR negotiations, and that 
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Korea is the main, if not only, beneficiary of the agree-
ment. It follows from this supposition that it is Korea 
that stands to lose from a rejection of the agreement. The 
EU, in contrast, might come off better by a rejection. At 
worst, EUKOR can be subject to a second round of rati-
fication. At best, it can be renegotiated in order to give 
Europe further favours. 
The second myth is that the agreement is unfair to the 
European automobile industry and will present this bat-
tered sector with yet another challenge of profound, if 
not existential, dimensions. 
It should be clear from past chapters that these myths are 
just that: myths. They do not correspond with the actual 
substance of the agreement or its real effects. It is pos-
sible to challenge the agreement on material reasons: the 
benefits of EUKOR are small, perhaps too small for an 
agreement to be worthwhile. This argument, however, 
applies to most other bilateral trade negotiations. The 
conclusion, if this view is extended, is that Europe should 
bury its entire programme for bilateral trade negotiations 
plus a host of other agreements (like its neighbourhood 
policy) that fall short of delivering substantial economic 
benefits. Yet it is not criticism of this kind that forms the 
basis for current opposition to EUKOR. 
The European Union comes off comparatively well, given 
the overall conditions for benefits from bilateral trade, 
from EUKOR. It has negotiated a deep-integration agree-
ment that addresses NTBs and regulations that severely 
restrict market access for several important sectors. Such 
improvements are not only important in bilateral EU-
Korea trade; they will also form the basis for future FTA 
negotiations with other countries. By the mercantilist 
standard, the EU has negotiated an agreement that will 
change the bilateral trade balance in Europe’s favour. The 
current deficit in Europe’s bilateral trade with Korea is 
estimated to be largely erased. Overall, Europe has used 
its predominating market size to engineer new market 
access that requires policy reform by Korea. Europe has 
“paid”, or “given concessions”, primarily by the “logic of 
big numbers” – preferential access to a big market has 
greater volume effects on trade than access to a smaller 
market – and without conditioning improved access in 
Korea upon policy reform in Europe. To reciprocate in a 
largely even-handed manner (measured in trade volume), 
Korea had to accept much more policy liberalisation on 
its part; considerably more barriers had to be reduced. 
This is good for Korea – and partly explains why the GDP 
effect of EUKOR is higher for Korea than Europe. But it 
does not fit will with the mercantilists and their criticism 
of EUKOR. 
The second myth appears to be even more entrenched: 
the EU automobile sector will be the main loser of EU-
KOR as the agreement is unfair. To see why this view 
grossly misrepresents the agreement and its likely out-
come one has to consider three facts. Firstly, Korean au-
tomobile manufacturers compete principally in one seg-
ment of the market – small cars – and on the EU market it 
competes to a large extent with other foreign producers. 
All the other segments of the car market – not to mention 
trucks, busses and large transport vehicles – are largely 
unaffected by Korean competition. Secondly, export of 
heavy goods concentrated to a small number of firms will 
to a large extent be substituted by foreign direct invest-
ment. This is already a pattern in the sales of Korean car 
brands on the EU market. Concentrated to two brands, 
it has proven much more efficient to locate production 
in Europe rather than to export from Korea to Europe 
at high transportation costs. If anything, EUKOR is like-
ly to have a positive effect on the scale of Korean auto 
FDI in Europe. Thirdly, European auto export to Korea 
stands to benefit as Korea not only eliminates its tariffs on 
vehicles (also at a faster pace than Europe eliminates its 
equivalent tariffs), but also reduces its NTBs significantly. 
Furthermore, Europe’s export of automobiles to Korea 
is dispersed on several segments and many brands, why 
outward FDI to Korea is less likely to substitute export.
These facts have not silenced the critique by parts of the 
EU car industry. One prominent argument used by ACEA 
is that the agreement gives Korean automobile manufac-
turers access to a market of 500 million citizens while 
Europe will gain access to a much smaller market. The 
EU car industry, it is concluded, has been a “bargaining 
chip” in Europe’s approach to the negotiations – and not 
a sector that warrants fair and tailored action by the EU.
The argument is hardly convincing. Again, it grossly mis-
represents the agreement and its likely outcome. But, 
more importantly, while the argument is ineffective as an 
argument against EUKOR (after all, the EU will increase 
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export more than Korea), it is more effective (if one ac-
cept a hard mercantilist logic) as an argument against bi-
lateral trade as such with smaller countries. 
Yet the mythology of the Korean car invasion remains the 
key reason why ratification of EUKOR may be rejected 
in Europe. It has taken a life of its own and created what 
should be viewed as the third myth: that the cost of saying 
no is (at worst) zero. No one can tell the alternative cost 
of ratifying EUKOR. It is a counterfactual – or a known 
unknown. Two positions in this debate are on the extreme 
side: that there will not be any effect or that the effects 
will be disastrous. While it is difficult to point to anything 
on the plus side, it is easy to point to some real hazards 
that are likely to materialise, to a high or low degree, if 
EUKOR is rejected.
Firstly, a rejection is likely to lower the interest on the 
part of other countries the EU is negotiating Free Trade 
Agreements with. Bilateral negotiations, too, are cum-
bersome and time consuming. The decision to launch FTA 
negotiations is based on trust between governments and 
assurances that a negotiation is for real and has the po-
litical acceptance at home. It will be particularly difficult 
to convince new candidates for a FTA that they should 
accept an invitation by the EU to negotiate trade deals. 
Very small economies with little to nothing to lose will 
always be very keen to get preferential access to the Eu-
ropean market, but the middle-sized and big economies 
that Europe should target in its bilateral policy will by 
any standard be hesitant, if not opposed, to venture into 
negotiations with Europe. 
Secondly, a rejection is likely to lower the market access 
gains that Europe will be offered in other FTA agree-
ments. If other countries doubt the EU is able to deliver 
ratified trade deals, they are less inclined to accept EU 
demands that are sensitive to their producer interests. 
Why take the political heat if one is doubtful about the 
probability that the agreement will ever enter into force?
Thirdly, a rejection by the EU is likely to be definite, 
more so than the rejection of KORUS by the United 
States. While the views of the US Congress can shift af-
ter an election, Europe does not have elections with such 
agenda-changing outcomes; policy in Europe is often a 
balance between many different country interests so that 
it is difficult to shift policy in one direction without caus-
ing reactions in the other end. If the deal is rejected, Ko-
rea may or may not be willing to go back to the drawing 
board to redesign the agreement to better fit Europe’s ap-
petite. The odds for Korea’s acceptance should, however, 
be very high. But even if it was willing to renegotiate the 
agreement, it is not inclined to change the balance fur-
ther in favour of Europe. Europe would lose from such a 
renegotiation. And it would never be able to get further 
flexibilities in the car sector than it has already received. 
It is simply unthinkable that a future EUKOR would not 
cover one of the key export sectors of Korea. 
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